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Their main task is border patrol, just like the German Bundesgrenzshutz. The apportionment of seats in this House of Representatives was based on the Sixteenth Census of the United States in She joined the Women's Army Corps in at the age of 20 as one of the few African-American women photographers in the military. IAB Gabrovnitza, 6. Clergy and Laymen Concerned About Vietnam, AR—Summits, Nixon-Brezhnev,
Daniel "Chappie" James Jr. The National Museum of the U. Air Force is located at:. Skip to main content Press Enter. Air Force, or the Department of Defense, of the external website, or the information, products or services contained therein. Featured Links. Museum location. Civil Service. Air Force. Air Force Materiel Command. Wright-Patterson AFB. AFM Foundation. Become a Member. Donate to the Foundation. United States policy is not concerned about the political or economic outcome of negotiations between the two sides.
The only demand made by the US is that the final outcome must be accomplished peacefully. Of course the United States would prefer an outcome that helps to solve human rights, trade, and proliferation issues, but it is prepared to live with any peaceful solution arrived at between the two sides. Hundreds of books, monographs and articles have been written about the security and militaries of China and Taiwan. Most in English that focus on China are about a potential confrontation with the United States or are general, and often contain only a chapter about the cross strait problem.
Many official documents have been prepared by the governments of each side about the military factor from their own perspective, and those writings are usually limited to the cross strait military balance, invasion scenarios or military to military relationships. Most military analyses are not placed in the economic or political context.
Much analysis of the political factor does not include military considerations and much economic analysis avoids both military and political elements. Single factor analyses circulated and discussed within a government bureaucracy military, political or economic generally leads to parochial interests and tunnel- vision positions that in turn lead to intragovernmental debate. This means that negotiations between different governments are often hampered by the internal debate of each of the participants. In some cases that can be dangerous if one part of the bureaucracy holds an inordinate amount of power and can prevail in the debate.
It leads to the potential for serious miscalculations that, in the case of the military factor, when not mitigated by economic or political concerns, could lead to war. Successful military planners, at least from the time of Sun Tzu approximately 5 th Century B. For a protracted war a fourth key element is added: comprehensive military strength or the ability to sustain a war over a period of time based on population strength, total industrial capacity, national will, etc. Since the terrain does not change in the Taiwan Strait and the weather constantly changes, they will not be considered in this study except as described in the Geography section of Chapter One.
Within that category are two critical subdivisions: capability and intent. But first I will describe some external events not related to the Taiwan Strait issue, but have had an influence on the thinking. I will also describe the history of the cross strait confrontation to lay a foundation and to show the degree of U.
Tiananmen — June 4, The Tiananmen tragedy was viewed on television screens all over the world. Even though Communist leaders, and most Chinese citizens, believe they did the right thing to maintain stability and prevent China from going into a period of chaos, most world citizens perceived a clear example of human rights abuse. The rest of the world saw an army using tanks to run over its own students. Many nations compared the spectacle to similar confrontations in Korea and Japan where large student demonstrations have been routinely subdued with pepper spray or water cannons.
The impact on the Taiwan Strait issue is indirect. Because of the psychological impact on other nations of the world, it meant Taiwan could claim a little more credibility in their resistance to Chinese rule. Tiananmen added to their arguments about why they should become independent. The same psychological impact strengthened those in the United States who were concerned about support for Taiwan.
It added to the ability of those who were determined to supply Taiwan with defensive weapons. Supporting Taiwan was less of a political issue in the United States than it was before Tiananmen. It is a legacy that China will not be able to shed for some time. Cold War End — Fall The end of the Cold War also had a psychological influence, but in a different direction so it mitigated Tiananmen to a certain extent. The end of the Cold War ended the ability of defense specialists who based part of their rationale for supporting Taiwan on stemming the tide of international Communism.
It also, at first, seemed to reduce the fear of strong Soviet support to a Chinese military action against the United States. On the other hand, the end of the Cold War has seen a new fear develop. As Russia reduces its holdings of weapons systems and converts defense to civilian industries, much excess equipment airplanes and ships is made available for sale to China. Further, many nuclear and missile scientists who might otherwise become unemployed could conceivably find work in China. In actuality, so far this has not occurred. The few sales that have taken place do not significantly increase the Chinese capability against the United States.
The sale of SU fighter planes and Sovremenny class destroyers though did make China significantly stronger in the Taiwan Strait when compared only to Taiwan. That in turn enhances the argument that the U. The Gulf War — January-February The Gulf War was a major shock to Chinese military leaders. The use of very high technology weapons allowed allied forces to overcome the Iraqi military in a very short time and with very few casualties.
Many of the large weapons air defense missiles and tanks used by the Iraqi military were Chinese-made and were quickly neutralized. The Chinese got a view of how their own weapons might stand up to modern advanced American weapons systems. Military leaders began an immediate push to increase the pace of their own military modernization efforts and to delay any early confrontation with the U. Throughout the s Chinese military planners worked to develop new strategies to cope using asymmetrical warfare. They also focused on finding weaknesses in the U. The Gulf War constantly reminded them that they could not go too far in their confrontation against Taiwan and dampened even the military exercises and missile tests of described below.
When the two American aircraft carriers showed up they were reminded by the Gulf War of the major gap in military capability.
Air Force, and the remarkable advances made during the next executive order directing the integration of the armed forces. Despite. FROM THE FORWARD: This book describes the struggle to desegregate the post -World War II U.S. Army Air Forces and its successor, the U.S. Air Force, and.
Diplomatic Exchange with South Korea — August Not only were there strong economic ties, there were strong military ties. When South Korea made the move to recognize China and sever the formal diplomatic relationship with Taiwan it was a serious blow to Taiwan. This was the signal that the world was changing and that economic relationships had become more important to national interests than political or perhaps even military interests. Within Taiwan this change provided critics of the Kuomintang with the signal that they would have to change their entire strategy for the future.
It meant reducing the notion of political confrontation and increasing the economic relationship even more. It ended all hopes for the very senior conservative KMT leaders who were attempting to control the pace and scope of trade and investment into China.
In July the U. Senate held hearings and introduced resolutions Senate Resolutions and that expressed "the sense of the Senate that the Olympics in the year should not be held in Beijing or elsewhere in the People's Republic of China. In both cases the opposition from the U. From the Chinese perspective it was viewed as an effort to keep China weak in the world community. Even as late as March 21, the U. Congress was still introducing bills in the House and Senate Senate Concurrent Resolution 27 and House Concurrent Resolution that took aim at China's human rights record and tried to prevent the Olympics from being held in China.
Chinese leaders and citizens were extremely upset about this action and it contributed greatly to general anti-American feelings.
At the least it provided more ammunition to those Chinese leaders who insisted on taking a hard line against the Americans in the later confrontations over the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Kosovo and the EP-3 reconnaissance plane incident. Lee Denghui Visit to Cornell — June , One event that had a profound impact on cross strait relations, greater than expected by anyone in Taiwan or the U. The Lee visit was an excellent example of a behavior that was interpreted by China as action that would lead to splitting China and Taiwan politically.
Although not explicit in the three U. Visas were not issued. Visits by US senior executive branch leaders to Taiwan were also not allowed during that period. President Lee had graduated from Cornell University with a Ph. He was invited to give a commencement speech in May At first he was turned down by the U.
State Department under President Clinton. At the time pressures to give him a visa came from the U. Congress where there was a strong anti-Chinese and pro-Taiwan bias. That basic conflict between the executive and legislative branches continues today. Several events contributed to the congressional vote. In May , President Lee, transiting the U. He was forced to sleep overnight on the plane and this angered Congress. The contrast was stark. The executive branch had allowed a known terrorist, over British objections, to enter the U. But they had refused entry to the leader of a new Asian democracy.
On March 9, the visa for President Lee to visit Cornell was denied and that was a final straw for congress. They passed a resolution in both houses to issue Lee a visa. The resolution was to 0 May 2, in the House and 91 to 1 May 9, in the Senate. It was not a bipartisan issue, but it was an issue between the executive and legislative branches of government, and it was a strong indication of congressional sentiment about Taiwan.
The State Department had complicated the issue by formally assuring China on several occasions that a visa would not be issued. The congressional vote forced the President to act and on May 22, it was announced that President Lee would be issued a visa to visit his alma mater. The decision had major repercussions. The visa decision undercut the credibility of the U. State Department in dealing with China. It also reduced the authority of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs within the Chinese Government and ultimately increased the voice of the hardliners who were in favor of more active military pressure on Taiwan.
The first reaction of the Chinese was to cancel all US-China military exchange visits. China also used this occasion, partially based on pressures from senior PLA officers, to reduce bilateral cooperative discussions on arms control topics. In the week after the Lee speech the Chinese Ambassador to Washington was recalled to China and the approval of the new Ambassador to China, a former Senator, was delayed. Close examination of this incident provides some insight into the conflict between the executive and legislative branches in the U. But the quick negative reaction on both sides of the Strait has complicated the issue even further.
This declaration was signed the next month after the missile tests in the Taiwan Strait in March. While it was not connected, the timing suggested to many Chinese leaders that it was and that it represented an effort to prepare for a military confrontation between the U. This message came through particularly in the wording of the declaration. It stated:. For more than a year, the two governments conducted an intensive review of the evolving political and security environment of the Asia-Pacific region and of various aspects of the Japan-U.
On the basis of this review, the Prime Minister and the President reaffirmed their commitment to the profound common values that guide our national policies: the maintenance of freedom, the pursuit of democracy, and respect for human rights. For the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, the United States of America is granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan.
This statement becomes important to a cross strait conflict because strong American air and naval assets are located in U. Not only does the declaration specifically mention the support of U. In that case, Japan would be obligated to provide support to the United States. The declaration also explicitly laid the legal groundwork for later cooperation in the joint development of Theater Missile Defense TMD weapons which later, after the firing of the North Korean Taepodong missile across Japan, became an active project.
Further, since part of TMD is a satellite surveillance system, it would take very little effort technically to extend the coverage of a Japanese TMD system to Taiwan. Nearly every Chinese has a personal story of how their family was victimized by Japanese soldiers. They also remember the Japanese use of biological and chemical weapons in Northeast China.
As a result, nearly all Chinese leaders have a sincere suspicion that Japan will someday remilitarize and that its principal target will be China again. This thought process contributed to a mitigation of the Chinese response to the joint U. Chinese leaders still worry, however, about Japanese support for the United States in the event of a more likely event: a war with the United States over Taiwan. This event also suggested to some in the United States and Japan that China should play a more important and active role in containing the North Koreans.
In a sense the firing of the missile across Japan brought the U. That, in turn, translates to being prepared to cooperate in all efforts to assure peace and stability in the region and that would include the Taiwan Strait area. It was another example of military high technology. They were able to identify areas for the PLA to reinforce to prevent such a strategy from being successful against them. They believe they could prepare in advance and withstand an attack by the United States. This hope was combined with the real belief that if they could cause the war to be protracted, the U.
All five bombs hit the Chinese embassy in Belgrade and killed three Chinese journalists and injured twenty embassy personnel. The Americans claimed they did not know the building was a Chinese Embassy. The influence on the Taiwan Strait confrontation was indirect. The principal result of the bombing was that the senior military leaders in China who preferred a hard stand against the United States were given more support.
This incident, combined with the EP-3 incident in April , provided sufficient high visibility proof to most Chinese that the U. The result was an increase in the strength of hardliner military voices in the internal Chinese debate on how to deal with the United States. This would include those who insist that a military solution to the Taiwan Strait confrontation is desired.
Afghanistan War on Terror — October 7, World Trade Center in New York City a coalition force, supported by countries offering military support and countries offering some form of financial assistance, attacked al-Qaeda and the Taliban inAfghanistan. The Chinese watched as B-2 Bombers struck from bases in the center of the United States, Bs struck from Europe, and Fs struck from nearby aircraft carriers.
Even modern attack helicopters and unmanned air vehicles were used effectively. The Chinese again had to reassess their own capabilities if they were to meet the United States in the Taiwan Strait area. They became a little less confident than they were after the Kosovo War. It was another event that dampened the eagerness of senior Chinese military men to confront U. The principal influence of entry into the WTO by China and Taiwan is that both are now being more fully integrated into the world trade system and some of the barriers to China-Taiwan trade and investment are being removed.
Most important is that both China and Taiwan are in the limelight and any military confrontation between the two will harm them both and their dealings with other world countries. This means that economic leaders in China gained strength in their voice about international foreign policy. This balances the internal debate with military leaders over what to do in the Taiwan Strait. Spratly Islands Issue Settled — November 4, The sixth claimant is Taiwan. Even though Taiwan now occupies the largest of the islands, Itu Aba, its claim is based on history and is essentially the same as that of China, which occupies several of the other reefs, so the two do not compete over the issue.
Reaching an accord in means the main point of conflict between ASEAN countries and China has been essentially resolved. Lee realized that the more Taiwan became entangled in the economic development of China, the more difficult it would be to maintain a safe political distance from China.
That in turn placed more pressure on Taiwan when it came to persuading the world that any Taiwan Strait conflict is the entire fault of China; especially if such a conflict occurs after a major political move by Taiwan like declaring independence. Liberation of Iraq by Coalition Forces — Spring, The war has reinforced their previous conclusions that high-tech warfare will be critical in the future. They have noted major changes in the strategies of military warfare. It allowed military strategists and analysts to analytically tie military and political action together much as the concepts of murder and motive are linked.
It created a different way to think about warfare and caused new military strategies to be developed. At that time the basis for military action was simply that one side perceived it had the ability to win a military victory over the other side. That analysis was based upon comparison of military strength as defined by quantity of soldiers and quality of weapons systems.
In some cases the calculation also included such factors as total industrial capacity, national will, and even geography. The theory generally stated that international centers of power include alliances that balance power between the sides. Balance of power theory, it was stated, is most effective in preventing war when there are at least three major centers where two centers confront each other and the third serves as a balancer. The third side prevents an attack by either of the other two by creating an uncertainty as to which side it would join in the case of hostilities.
The next major watershed in strategic military thought was the American use of atomic weapons to end World War II. At that time the fundamental approach to strategy transitioned from comparison of conventional capabilities and political alignments to one of mutual deterrence based on fear of destruction by nuclear weapons. Destruction was even defined in terms of percentage of population, industry and enemy troops that could be destroyed in a first or second strike. The current military activity in Iraq and Afghanistan will become as significant in strategic military thought as was the dropping of nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of World War II.
The new focus of strategic military thought will focus on intelligence collection to identify critical targets of a potential enemy, penetration capability using such weapons as stealth bombers and stand-off cruise missiles; precision guided weapons that can surgically destroy identified military targets with a minimum of civilian casualties, and weapons such as bunker buster bombs that can penetrate protected targets.
It will allow military planners to delay actual military confrontation on the front lines between infantry or naval units as they narrowly target key decision-makers and communications facilities to sever the command and control of the other side. Chinese military leaders understand this major transition to new strategies of warfare as they understood the importance of nuclear weapons in the s.
They will continue to emphasize military research and development to find ways to counter surveillance and ordnance guidance systems by neutralizing opposition satellites. But at the same time, they will become more cautious about confronting the United States over Taiwan. They understand the potential destruction that could be delivered on them through surgical strikes of key military or government facilities or leadership targets. American superiority has also been reinforced in the initial showing of Patriot air defense missiles which could be a prelude to a workable theater missile defense system.
There is no doubt that the strategic environment in which Chinese officials now make military decisions has completely changed. The consequences of these changes suggest that a military confrontation between China and the United States over Taiwan is now much less likely. The Nationalist-Communist military confrontation began in earnest in July when peace negotiations broke down.
At that time Taiwan was able to maintain control of three groups of key offshore islands; Jinmen, Mazu and the Dazhen group of islands. Farther out in the strait they kept control of the Penghu Islands and finally the main island of Taiwan. After Communist forces had defeated Nationalist forces in Xiamen in October, , they continued their attack by invading Jinmen Island. Between and there was a broad and complicated debate in the United States about whether to recognize the new Communist regime in China and abandon the Nationalists who by were in exile in Taiwan.
Department of State under Dean Acheson promoted abandoning the Nationalists and recognizing China as a means to possibly entice China away from the Soviet Union. The U. Congress, some influenced by an effective Taiwan lobby, was reluctant to abandon Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalists. The formal military recommendation by the U. Joint Chiefs of Staff, in December , was to help the Nationalists and help defend Taiwan by sending a military mission there. Part of this debate was whether to recognize Communist China and let Taiwan go, or to protect Taiwan from a Communist invasion.
Even our ally, the British, had decided to recognize China in January and had reached an accommodation over Hong Kong. The debate was also influenced by the McCarthy Hearings in congress at the time. Next came a speech made by President Truman on January 5, They considered several alternatives from independence to a UN Trusteeship.
Their findings in a policy review , suggested that Taiwan was a part of China and that it was now, under Chiang Kai- shek, the seat of government under China even though the KMT only controlled Taiwan and Hainan Island at the time. In any case, this began the continuous off and on confrontation between the US President and the Congress over Taiwan that continues today. The Chinese Communists made two mistakes in that settled the debate in the United States. Truman's order was a remarkable statement that included calling on Taiwan to cease all air and sea operations against the Mainland.
This was perhaps the first formal statement that, from a U. China's Premier Chou Enlai immediately responded by stating that Truman's statement and the move of U. Navy into the area constituted aggression against China. China's formal designation as an enemy during the Korean War also facilitated the American suggestion that Taiwan's government conclude a peace treaty with Japan to clarify the status of Taiwan, including the Penghu Islands, and the Paracel Islands.
China's Chou Enlai's response was to immediately renounce the idea as a violation of the Cairo Declaration , the Yalta Agreement and the Potsdam Proclamation because he believed Taiwan had no right to speak for China. Since Taiwan still represented "China" in the United Nations at that time and because China was considered an enemy of the UN because it was fighting on the side of North Korea, the treaty was considered valid by the international community.
America's policy of "Containment of Communism" caused the United States to choose friends and allies who were anti-Communist, and few fit the description better than Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalists in Taiwan. During the Korean War, Chiang Kai-shek offered to send Nationalist troops to help in Korea, but American military leaders worried about control, having experience working with Nationalist troops before, and did not trust the effort. Some thought Chiang would not stop if the war progressed to the Chinese border. He did serve a purpose though in accepting about 20, Chinese Communist prisoners who wanted to defect to Taiwan.
During the War, after the Chinese had entered and become somewhat successful in their counterattacks against the Americans, there were discussions about a negotiated settlement. In the meantime, back in Taiwan, the U. President Truman, in late November, hinted that the U. Both were rationalized in terms of helping to strengthen Nationalist forces to contain Communism in Asia and both were perceived by China as interference in their Civil War. American policy was to strengthen alliances against the Communist Bloc that included China. On March 8, , the two countries signed the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement entered into force May 1, , which focused on defense assistance.
China began to see itself encircled by the Western powers. The idea was considered but not acted upon until then Vice-president Richard Nixon traveled to Taiwan, in November , and the Nationalist leaders formally proposed a mutual defense treaty. But it was more than words. China deployed over , troops to southern Fujian, across from Taiwan. They also shelled Jinmen and little Jinmen. On September 4, the U. Navy sent three aircraft carrier groups to the area for training maneuvers for three weeks. The fighting was reduced in October, but picked up again on November 1, when the Communists initiated a full-scale attack against the Dazhen Island Group.
The Communist side increased military pressure in December by increasing its naval activity and by setting up new artillery positions nearby. The motivation for the attacks in the summer and fall of was primarily political: to influence the negotiations taking place between Taiwan and the United States and within the United States over a mutual defense treaty. To a lesser extent the attacks were intended to dissuade the SEATO powers from including Taiwan in its area of concern and to discourage the formation of a Northeast Asia Treaty Organization.
Each time negotiations were highlighted in the press, the Chinese Communists increased the intensity of their bombing and attacks. As the negotiations profile lowered, the attack intensity lowered. The Communists were telling U. They used every sort of propaganda tool they could. On November 23, when the U. The announcement about the airmen was more of a punishment. The attacks worked to a degree to hold up the signing of the Mutual Defense Treaty hereafter referred to as MDT , but ultimately it was concluded. During the Fall of efforts to conclude a ceasefire in the United Nations were not successful.
Both Taiwan and China were afraid that any de jure ceasefire would lead to a divided nation like Korea. It did however, leave a loophole that could be later interpreted to allow defense of other islands if those islands appeared to be a part of a larger invasion of Taiwan. Senate on January 6, On January 10 the Communists attacked the Dazhen Islands with over planes.
On January 18, , about 4, Communist amphibious troops, under cover of naval gunfire, artillery and airplanes, attacked Ijiangshan, one of the islets, eight miles from the Dazhen Island Group. Sustaining heavy casualties, they killed all Nationalist defenders who fought to the last man. The day after the attack began, January 19, President Eisenhower, for political more than military reasons, decided to evacuate the Dazhens. He needed congressional support for the evacuation and needed to bargain with Chiang Kai-shek to force him to give up the islands.
Eisenhower got the Formosa Resolution from the U. His bargain with the Nationalists was that the U. The Nationalists, under U. That left only Jinmen and Mazu as offshore islands under Nationalist control. Navy deployed an armada of five or six carriers, two to four cruisers, abut forty destroyers, and auxiliary ships, to cover the evacuation. Air Force sent planes to Taiwan, patrolled the Strait heavily, and went on a full war basis in the East. In March the Communists, partially because of the U.
Senate reviewed the MDT and added the idea that there would have to be mutual agreement between the U. They also noted that before such action could be taken the President would have to seek the advice and consent of the Senate. Senate ratified the MDT on February 9, by a vote of The signing of the Mutual Defense Treaty had at least five lasting legacies for U. All five worked to ensure that the U. The first legacy made it clear that during the period covered by the MDT the Communists could not exercise political sovereignty over Taiwan unless they won a war with the United States or if they were able to reach an accommodation with Taiwan to join the PRC.
Second, Taiwan was elevated to a diplomatic level equivalent to Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand, each of which had signed mutual defense treaties with the United States. This in turn, supported their claim to be the legitimate government of all of China and their hold on the UN seat. It also ultimately supported the claim of Taiwan statehood because part of the criteria for statehood is the ability to conclude treaties at the nation-state level. Taiwan hoped this would lead to being included in later multi-lateral defense treaties designed to contain Communism, but that did not happen.
Third, the MDT had the potential to provide a basis for a later Taiwan independence effort. Lower level U. Some viewed potential scenarios like responding to an attack on the offshore islands with a counterattack in Korea, now stalemated at the 38 th parallel, and a second front in Hainan Island to protect Southeast Asia from Communist expansion.
Communist leaders had good cause to be concerned about the MDT and the thinking about a counterattack. For the purposes of Articles II and V, the terms "territorial" and "territories" shall mean in respect of the Republic of China, Taiwan and the Pescadores; and in respect to the United States of America, the island territories in the West Pacific under its jurisdiction. The provisions of Articles II and V will be applicable to such other territories as may be determined by mutual agreement. Finally, the Mutual Defense Treaty was the basis for stationing U. Army, Navy and Air Force bases were established in Taiwan and American advisors were stationed with Nationalist troops even on the islands of Jinmen and Mazu.
No ground combat forces were stationed on Taiwan, as on Okinawa or in Japan, but the number of support and intelligence personnel reached over 5, in Thousands of U. Military personnel developed close personal ties with individuals in the Nationalist military. The presence was very visible.
When the U. It was terminated, based on a one-year notice clause in the treaty, on January 1, , but the last military personnel departed Taiwan in April In the months after the signing of the MDT and the announcement of the Formosa Resolution tensions in the Strait began to subside for a number of reasons.
At one point the Soviets tried to convene an international conference to address the problem, but it was not possible to get China and Taiwan to sit at the same table for negotiations; a precursor of later efforts to solve the cross strait problem. On August 1, , the U.
Chou Enlai said the Communists would try to recover Taiwan using peaceful means, but could not renounce the use of force as a last resort; another similarity with the situation today. One lasting consequence of this period was that the United States was left as the only nation that was committed to the defense of Taiwan. The Second Cross Strait Crisis of The first purpose was to drive the United States out of the Taiwan area by highlighting the danger of another after Korea U.
It was another Chinese miscalculation at a time when the anti-communist mood in the country was still strong. The shelling did, however, bring some pressure on the U.
Part of the rationale for the shelling resulted from a U. Department of State memorandum that explained the U. This crisis started at a time, in the summer of when Ambassadorial Talks in Geneva, the only place where the U. China responded with the demand that the U. China delayed a response so there was a period in which there was no official channel of communication between the two sides.
On September 5, China agreed to resume talks believing their position had strengthened because of their efforts in Jinmen. This crisis involved the United States in three important ways. President Eisenhower stated that the offshore islands were important to the defense of Taiwan and were part of the U. Seventh Fleet to escort supply ships to Jinmen and Mazu to break the attempted blockade.
China, on September 4, went on record to claim its territorial waters extended to 12 miles, but the U. The statement explicitly included Taiwan and the offshore islands in the claim. Secondly, the U. Airbase outside the city of Taichung in Taiwan. It was capable of handling Bs, the most dangerous strategic weapon of the time. Finally, the U. Nuclear weapons were not removed from Taiwan until China, during the period from August 23 to October 4, bombarded Jinmen with , artillery rounds. At the same time, the U. They added eight-inch howitzers and Sidewinder air-to-air missiles.
Shelling was increased just before he visited Taiwan on October Again, the Communists were making a political statement with their artillery. Once the Communists were convinced that the U. On the same day Peng made an appeal to the Taiwanese to unify with China. It was a constant reminder that China and Taiwan were still at war.
They did not want to get the offshore islands back without Taiwan. A legal case for US support was made in December by pointing out that there was no formal ceding of Taiwan to China and contrary to the UN Charter; China was trying to take territory that did not belong to it by force. The crisis part of the U. Tensions continued, but it was no longer a crisis and it was no longer believed that the shelling was a prelude to an invasion of the main island of Taiwan.
China considered the United States to be the power in control of Taiwan. We do not want conciliation with the U. The United States must submit to us. Otherwise we do not wish to enter into negotiations with them. It is unimportant if they do not return Taiwan to us for another years.
If they do not recognize us,then we have no desire to recognize them either. The Third Cross Strait Crisis in That treaty began a major reinforcement of China's fear that America and Japan were conspiring against China and that fear has persisted to today. Food shortages and unrest appeared all over China.
If the Emperor had ruled badly and there were also natural disasters, it was believed the Emperor had lost the right to rule and revolution was justified. As , refugees escaped into Hong Kong and the Chinese were having problems with the USSR on their northern border, Chiang Kai-shek saw an opportunity to recover the mainland. Our armed forces have made adequate preparations for the counter-offensive, and, therefore, are capable of moving into action at any time.
Have no fear of being alone in rising against the Communists. Have no fear of lack or shortage of supplies or help. Both will be forthcoming once you take action. Kirk, who had experience with amphibious operations in World War II. The Nationalists did send some commando teams into China, but they were not very successful and by then the pressures from the U. Talks in Warsaw also convinced the Communists that the U. A Quiet Period While this period can be described as a quiet period in cross strait activity, it was definitely not quiet in the overall strategic relationships between the United States, China and Taiwan.
This was the period in which the United States changed its formal diplomatic recognition from the Republic of China in Taiwan to the Peoples' Republic of China on the Mainland. It was also the period in which China replaced Taiwan in the United Nations and gained international legitimacy. He changed his strategy to trying to subvert the Mainland from within rather than invade from the outside. It was also during this period when the Nationalists realized that if they could not get their foot in the door during such a chaotic period, it was not likely that they could ever succeed by confrontation.
As a result they began to focus on building Taiwan more than on returning to the Mainland. United States leaders began to see that while tensions persisted, the likelihood of direct military confrontation between Taiwan and China had stabilized. President Richard Nixon began to take steps to improve the U. He also reduced trade and travel restrictions, opened a dialogue with China, and announced the U. The first major visit by Americans to China was in April when a ping-pong team that was in Japan at the time was invited to visit China for exhibition matches.
At that time a press officer for the U. Department of State reiterated that U. The only American interest, again, was that it be done peacefully. Taiwan suspected immediately that the language would be a problem and in a Foreign Ministry statement expressed shock and asked the U. It was a major diplomatic step forward for the Chinese.
This opened the door for a number of states to recognize China and withdraw their embassies from Taiwan. While all this was happening in U. The path for the UN action was paved by the major U. The general rationale for the U. In the long run, no stable and enduring international order is conceivable without the contribution of this nation of more than million people. Status is determined -- one China, Taiwan is part of China Will not support Taiwan independence 3. Try original emphasis to restrain Japan -- from increasing influence on Taiwan 4.
Support peaceful resolution 5. Will seek normalization. Strategically, an effort to work with China to balance the power of the Soviet Union was also a major contributing consideration. So too was the effort to solicit China's help in ending the Vietnam War. The — Cross Strait Missile Crisis This period lasted until October when China began to conduct a series of military amphibious combined arms exercises in the area opposite and around Taiwan. These exercises were punctuated with tests of ballistic missiles for effect. It was a demonstration of potential military capability. The next major demonstration designed to influence politics within Taiwan included the firing of six nuclear capable DF M-9 missiles to an area within 90 miles of Taiwan in July.
The tests were announced only three days before they began and there was little fanfare about them. Prior to this time the PLA was not experienced at amphibious operations or combined arms operations. The leadership had not boasted very much about their capabilities to invade Taiwan successfully. The PLA had never conducted an opposed amphibious operation so there was no military doctrine written for it.
First a test activity or demonstration project is tried and if it works it is refined and written as doctrine. These first two exercises and were the beginning of that process. They had to develop clear doctrine on how to integrate artillery, air forces, navy, marines and other logistics support. The confidence level was not high at the time, but the PLA was still able to demonstrate a large scale operation was possible and the emphasis on amphibious operations was a clear message to Taiwan. The United States did not stand by idly.
On December 12, Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph Nye after returning from a visit to Beijing issued a warning that an escalation of the cross strait conflict could be catastrophic. This passage was an important political signal because it was the first time in seventeen years that a U. Nonetheless, the U. Navy could have expected the Chinese Navy to monitor the passage and the message that the U. In Taiwan the forces for Taiwan independence were getting stronger and more vocal.
Chinese leaders saw a popular Taiwanese President, Lee Tenghui, running for re-election. As explained in Chapter Two he appeared to be moving closer to Taiwan independence which Communist leaders would not tolerate. When they considered options to influence the election they decided to display military force again to get the attention of the Taiwanese.
Again the use of force was for political reasons, not military. Secretary of Defense, William Perry, announced on March 8 that the USS Independence aircraft carrier battle group would be moved into the area and on March 12 the Pentagon announced that a second battle group with the USS Nimitz would also be deployed to the area partially because Chinese intentions were not clear. The first deployment was symbolic and probably perceived as such by the Chinese.
The second group meant the U. It was a serious confrontation in which two nuclear powers came into direct conflict. The conflict carried equally serious political messages. Although neither U. They did engage in electronic warfare by monitoring Chinese tests and exercise activity. What was most unexpected was the escalation of rhetoric directed not at Taiwan but at each other by China and the United States. The Chinese rhetoric came at three levels: very strident in the Chinese-controlled press in Hong Kong, less strident in official government announcements and conciliatory by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Generally the Chinese military message was that they could, using high-tech warfare, inflict enough damage on the U. Navy to cause them to withdraw because the American military would have no support at home. They had studied Vietnam, Somalia, Bosnia and Chechnya. On the other hand, the United States also displayed its resolve. Not only did the military show its capability in the area with a wide array of modern weapons, the U. Department of State, like the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, expressed grave concern and cautioned both sides to solve the problem peacefully.
The Pentagon was the strongest, pointing out that the U. The Chinese had two target audiences in mind for the exercises: the Taiwanese and the Americans. Some have written that the primary effort of the exercises was to prevent President Lee Denghui from being re-elected and therefore it was a failure. The principal rationale behind the exercises for the Taiwanese audience though was to sensitize them that movement toward Taiwan independence was unacceptable and that China had the will and capacity to do serious damage to Taiwan if they persisted. They could punish Taiwan by interrupting all shipping that was vital to island commerce.
This was driven home to the Taiwanese when their stock market plummeted right after the missile tests. The result of the demonstration was that the Taiwanese became much more sensitive to the threat. While Lee won re-election, there is no doubt that the issue of Taiwanese independence could no longer be used in a political atmosphere in which the vast majority of Taiwanese favored the status quo. Local factions of the Democratic Progressive Party politicians who ran exclusively on the Taiwan independence platform lost. The PLA successfully took Taiwan independence out of the competing issues for that and future elections.
For that reason the military exercises were considered a great success by China. From a Taiwanese perspective, even though they got the message that China was serious and would not tolerate movement toward independence, they also got a major political message from the United States during the crisis when two U. The effect on the American target audience was not so successful from China's perspective.
Militarily it caused the U. Congress to again come to the aid of Taiwan and insist they be reinforced with more weaponry, particularly air defense weapons, and that other means of cooperation be expanded. Chinese military leaders also received a clear message. They found a threshold that would provoke the United States to action. The military exercises of also created a negative response by other nations of the world.
While none of them came out to support an increased military role to defend Taiwan, many of them did privately counsel China to exercise restraint. One major change in Chinese official statements that occurred at this time was the clarification of the target of the use of force. For the first time a Chinese leader said that the main reason China reserved the right to use force to solve the Taiwan problem was to prevent outsiders from coming to the aid of Taiwan. They reinforced the policy that they would resolve the problem peacefully by themselves and they made clear the only three conditions under which they would use force: If there is any major incident causing Taiwan to break away from China 2.
If there is foreign occupation of Taiwan 3. If Taiwan authorities refuse to negotiate. The Taiwan Strait was generally quiet after the confrontation in There were an increasing number of incidents between PLA and Taiwan aircraft when they were patrolling the area, but generally both stayed on their own side of an agreed upon line.
Both sides observed the rules and if they got too close they broke off contact to avoid any serious political incident. Throughout the period, in fact for more than 40 years, the United States maintained its own independent intelligence-collection reconnaissance flights off the coast of China. The flight path included the Taiwan Strait area between China and Taiwan. There was a strong feeling by the PLA that the U.
One of the PLA planes bumped it to the point that the Chinese plane crashed into the sea and killed the pilot. They were treated well, interrogated and released after 12 days of negotiations between the U. The Chinese were able to examine the intelligence equipment and it can be presumed that they gained some new intelligence information about U. The Chinese refused to allow the U. They also refused to allow a U. The task was finished on July 7.
The incident was caught on videotape and that combined with the instrument data proved that the American plane was on autopilot and did not veer off path. It was clearly the fault of the Chinese pilot who got too close in a jet that was not designed to fly so slowly. The important consequences for the larger Taiwan Strait issue is that even though the PLA was completely at fault the Chinese government was able to convince the PLA and the Chinese people that it was totally the American fault.
They were able to make the lost pilot a national hero. They were helped by the anti-American atmosphere that had emerged after the accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Yugoslavia on May 7, Nearly all Chinese were convinced that this incident too was a deliberate military attack on the Chinese. Since the EP-3 incident the Taiwan Strait has been quiet. The rest of this chapter will be devoted to an analysis of the military potential of China, Taiwan and the United States.
It will include the threat perceptions as well as the military capabilities and doctrine of all three; an analysis of possible military scenarios for conflict in the Taiwan Strait and finally how the military factor influences the ongoing negotiations for a settlement of the cross strait conflict. Although the likelihood of military conflict, especially nuclear conflict is now unlikely, we must still examine the military potential of each side to help keep the Taiwan Strait issue in perspective.
Most analyses of the cross strait military confrontation focus on the quantification of troops and weapons. These factors will then be placed into the context of various war fighting scenarios.
Most military planners in each of the three areas China, Taiwan and the United States consider both capability and intent before they go into battle. One phenomenon that separates the thought processes of the three sides is that the U. China and Taiwan give slightly more value to intent in their planning.
This disconnect often creates problems between the U. But for the United States the rationale has to be stretched. When it comes to planning an actual campaign in the Taiwan Strait area all three may keep the defensive notion of security in mind, but they actually think in terms of offensive military capability. Even Taiwan has recently discussed the possibility of developing a more offensive-oriented deterrent capability. Threat Perceptions. Threat perception is important because it drives the force structures and strategies of the military forces.
China has been able to demonize certain elements in Taiwan as key enemies of the Chinese people. They also view the United States as a potential enemy because a broad range of statements by American leaders especially the U. Congress and many past actions show of force in the Taiwan Strait and arms sales to Taiwan that seems to them to encourage the separatist activity. We will work in utmost sincerity and do all we can to strive for a peaceful reunification. Our position of never undertaking to renounce the use of force is not directed at our Taiwan compatriots.
It is aimed at the foreign forces' attempts to interfere in China's reunification and the Taiwan separatist forces' schemes for "Taiwan independence.
At first glance it appears as though defining the threat to Taiwan is relatively simple. There is no question about which country is the principal perceived threat. But why China is still the threat and how the threat may be applied requires more analysis.
The main problem is that not everyone in Taiwan agrees about the threat. The Democratic Progressive Party DPP generally agrees that the PRC is a threat, but they point out that Taiwan has changed so much that historical and cultural continuity are not so important.