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III, [defs. Stock, Kathleen, ed. Compared with the ideas I have very quickly examined above, this one is not so easily rejected, if only because it has been held by Michael Dummett, one of the most prominent figures of the analytic tradition. And there is little discussion of the emergence of empirical approaches such as behaviorism to memory in psychology, potentially limiting the usefulness of the book to readers outside of philosophy. Three topics became prominent: the expression of emotion in music, the nature of musical works, and what is involved in understanding and appreciating music. Here, Anscombe describes a case of everyday human interaction: a grocer sells me potatoes.
III, pp. Sarkar and J. The first two sections consider exegetical and textual problems associated with the version of the definition as published and the traditional reading. The final two sections offer a reconstruction of the version from unpublished lecture notes and an interpretation in light of recent scholarly discussion. To that end I discuss the institutional struggle of the Belgian philosopher, Leo Apostel , who aimed to found a politically engaged, logical empiricist inspired program at Ghent University between and On a logically-oriented view, it is the sense of colloquial sentences that lends significance to the elementary sentences, not the other way around.
I argue in this talk that logical atomism is rather, as Russell tells us, a logical view. It is best understood as a search for logical forms, not as a search for logical atoms. Then I present the outline of a different account grounded in the ladder structure of the book and its numbering system. I prove this by a close examination of a reference to a Cambridge mathematician E. Yet several of his other claims seem to support scientific anti-realism.
What then does his realism amount to? Are his commitments in tension with one another? In this essay, I attempt to resolve both of these questions. I conclude by briefly gesturing toward some striking contours of a Quinean scientific realism. Employed at scales both great and small, it involves Quine bringing the philosophical discussion to a moment of extreme conceptual crisis, only to adroitly draw back and proclaim that everything is okay—despite the fact that everything has changed.
Naturalism saves the day, he claims. I turn to Cavell to outline such a modernist frame — which pushes questions of reception or inheritance, of continuation via other means or media, and threatened with accusations of fraudulence — in order to flesh out this central claim of the paper. The aim of this paper is to chart the historical origins of this concept of a proposition.
I will argue that it is the product of a conflation of two diametrically opposed theories of propositions, one due to Frege and the other to the early Russell. The contemporary notion of a singular proposition is a hybrid of these Fregean and Russellian views. In addition to explaining this conflation and raising some additional problems, I will show how the contemporary notion arose through the development of formal semantics, starting with Frege and continuing with Church, Carnap, Montague, Lewis, and ultimately Kaplan.
I argue that his ontology of pure sets is inconsistent with the manner by which he arrives at it. From examining these essential similarities, I argue that, even if Russell did not explicitly take his ideas from Husserl, there is a noteworthy philosophical connection between these views. In particular, I conclude that structural realism and neutral monism work together to go beyond phenomenology, but that phenomenology serves as part of the foundation for these views.
The debate about psychologism and the development of mathematics led Husserl nevertheless to further refine his view regarding logicism.
Philosophy written in English is overwhelmingly analytic philosophy, and the techniques and predilections of analytic philosophy are not only. Analytic philosophers often either scorn or simply ignore history of philosophy. forthcoming, ed., The Oxford Handbook of the History of Analytic Philosophy.
It implies that logicism assumes wrong primitive notions and uses mathematical, instead of philosophical method, to analyze its notions. I argue for four conclusions. Surprisingly, this position does not depend on his metaphysics of senses as objective but not actual. This paper aims at an adequate interpretation of the analogy between ornaments and nonsensical sentences put forth by Wittgenstein in It focuses on the term which usually receives less attention—that of ornaments—by considering the writings of Adolf Loos, whose influence Wittgenstein acknowledges.
This puts us in position to ask whether acquaintance is ever a non-mythical relation. My goal here is to better understand his view that science must aim at systems that are maximally simple, and which consist of proofs that follow relations of grounding among truths.
My central point is that the simplicity requirement and the grounding requirement are very closely linked: the grounding requirement is derived from, and justified by, the simplicity requirement. The upshot is that for Frege, rather than being a route to the truth or a mere aesthetic bonus, the simplicity of scientific systems stands at the very heart of the value of science itself.
It has been customary to explain it by pointing to a certain feature of his notion of acquaintance. Plausible as it is, this standard explanation leaves two tasks to be done. In this paper I address those two tasks in view of turning it into a more satisfactory explanation. But surely a person can judge without knowing. And surely a person can judge falsely. I discuss some of the issues concerning a notorious doctrine of Frege that sentences are names of truth-values. In the light of this analysis, I argue that the distinction is not obscured. His theory of picturing is meant to fill this gap, but I offer two arguments that it cannot.
The system there cannot enable the proof of any conjunction. Answers are given. Although now less widely discussed, at the time, in addition to Quine, Friedrich Waismann was seen as a critic of analyticity. Waismann, from to , wrote a series of six articles in Analysis on the subject, as part of what is taken to be a book project.
The project was never completed, likely due to his discussion being overshadowed by Quine. I will show that these expectations are mistaken. Waismann explicitly rejects an ordinary language understanding of analyticity, and he had a different understanding of the relationship between philosophy and science from Wittgenstein among other differences.
Standard problems from judgment aggregation theory show that sets of such beliefs are likely to be inconsistent and standard work from sociologists, political scientists, and critical theorists show that relying on such beliefs is likely to perpetuate problematic biases and prejudices. Lory Lemke University of Minnesota at Morris. In response, Frege wrote a series of papers in order to defend his work as well as to lay out a general philosophical framework which motivates it. McGuinness ed. It is commonplace in contemporary historical studies to distinguish two traditions in early mathematical logic: the algebra of logic tradition and the tradition pioneered by Frege.
Although he never defended a logicist position, Peano is usually linked to the Fregean tradition. In this talk I shall question this association. Although Donald Davidson is best known for his account of motivating reasons, towards the end of his life he did write about normative reasons, arguing that normative properties are at once objectively prescriptive and straightforwardly causal.
In the final section of the paper, I take up various grounds for doubting that objectively prescriptive properties could be causal. Why does logicism—the reduction of arithmetic to analytic judgments of logic—look promising to Frege and not Kant? John MacFarlane has argued that it is because for Frege and not Kant logic studies a special class of objects: the logical connectives, the quantifiers, etc. Is Wittgenstein an intuitionist? Scholars are divided.
Special attention is given to the application of inference rules to Latin letter generalizations. Frege does not tell his reader why this discussion is inserted, nor does he name an opponent. This approach is an important precursor for recent non-propositional and non-conceptual accounts of mental content. The talk will focus on different attempts by Carnap and Tarski to formulate the model theory for axiomatic theories within a type-theoretic framework.
The aim here will be twofold: first, to show how model-theoretic concepts were formulated in their work within a type-theoretic language. Second, to analyze ways in which the domain variation underlying these notions is recast within a fully interpreted logical framework. On the Explanation Reading, Quine treats set-theoretic inquiry as an explanatory context where different, conflicting answers to its questions may be proposed. By so doing, I shall indicate the transcendental turn Wittgenstein supposedly took in this period.
Within Analytic philosophy, the problems of negative existentials and intentional objects have raised great discussion among prominent philosophers, including Bertrand Russell. While Russell takes a linguistic approach to these problems, possibilists have proposed various ways of dealing with intentional objects through modal applications. This paper takes various possibilist modal solutions—including Meinongian, Lewisian, and Priestian ideas—to approach these problems through modal possibilities and ontological commitment.
I aim to show that sentences containing negative existentials and intentional sentences referring to non-actual objects can be meaningful and true by creating a distinction between being and actuality which is compatible to, but distinct from, possibilism.
The solution proposed here holds that all intentional objects exist somewhere, if not in the actual world then in some possible world, in which case they have being in the actual world according to this view of contextual actuality. Does accounting for the intelligibility of changes of paradigms imply relativizing the a priori element in knowledge? First, that kind of elucidation should not be confused with elucidation of primitive scientific terms.
Contra most commentators on Donald Davidson, I argue that there is no significant shift from his writings on radical interpretation to those on triangulation. In particular, I argue, Davidson always advocated semantic non-reductionism, and he always took this to be compatible with a constructive account of meaning. The history of early analytic philosophy, and especially the work of the logical positivists, has often been seen as involving antagonisms with rival schools.
Specifically, I will try to demonstrate that it is plausible that Wittgenstein has at least B-theorist leanings, and that even his apparent deflationism itself ends up amounting to something that is interestingly parallel to a B-theorist stance. The volume contains five substantial articles, as well as an introductory essay. I argue that Sellars has good reason to suppose that homogeneity is a necessary condition of any possible experience, including indirect experience of theoretical-explanatory posits, and therefore good reason to hold that Reductive Materialism, as he conceives it, is an untenable account of color.
The remainder of his argument aims to answer the question of what the metaphysical relation is between the state of an experiencing subject that we take color to be and the colorless microphysical particles that we take to constitute that subject.
After rejecting Substance Dualism, Epiphenomenalism, and Wholistic or Emergent Materialism as explanatorily inadequate, Sellars proposes that both color-states and micro-physical particles should be understood as manifestations of an underlying ontology on absolute processes. JHAP recently created a position of Editor for Special Issues with the purpose of offering support for first rate thematic collections of articles and encourage collective and collaborative publications in the field.
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