gatsbyestates.co.uk/la-tabla-negra-cuentos-cortos.php Hegel: Critical Assessments , vol.
Gram, M. Stepelevich and D. Lamb eds Hegel's Philosophy of Action. O'Hagan, T. Rawls, J. Hoy, D. Stern, P. Allison, H. Westphal, K. Including Hegels' critique of Kant's divorce of morality and feeling - see also 'Duty, desire and feelings in Hegel'. Including Hegel on form generating content in ethics. Knox , pp. Stern ed G. Pippin, R. Wood, Allen Kant's Ethical Thought , ch. Freyenhagen, Fabian 'Empty, dangerous and useless? Recent Kantian replies the empty formalism objection;, Hegel Bulletin 32 Hahn, Songsuk 'Logical form and ethical content', Hegel Bulletin 32 With dates of publication.
Fichte [Feb ] The Aenesidimus review, in G. Breazeale Fichte  'Some lectures concerning the scholar's vocation', in Early Philosophical Writings , tr. Heath and Lachs. Fichte, J. Daniel Breazeale. Fichte  The Vocation of Man , sec. Smith, , available online.
Fichte, Early Philosophical Writings , tr. Fichte, Introductions to the Wissenschaftslehre and Other Writings , tr. See also D. Breazeale, 'English Fichte bibliography' in D. Breazeale and T. Each issue of the North American's Fichtean Society's newletter Fichteana has a bibliography of recent work on Fichte.
See also the society's bibliography of Fichte's works in English translation. Smith, ed D. Introduction available online. Copleston, F. Tabor, J. Jalloch, C. Breazeale, D. Breazale, D. Solomon and K. Higgins eds Routledge History of Philosophy. Volume 6: The Age of German Idealism. Seidel, G. Martin, W. Beiser, Frederick German Idealism , part 2. Daniel Breazeale, section 6. Kant  'Open letter on Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre' , in I. Kant, Philosophical Correspondence , , tr. Zweig Lachs, J. Mandt, A. Taber, J. Reid, J. Christensen et al. Henrich, Dieter  'Fichte's "I"', Sententiae 31 2 , Philonenko, Alexis L'Oeuvre de Fichte , ch.
Pippin, Robert 'Fichte's contribution' in Philosophical Forum 19 , revised as ch. Neuhouser, Frederick Fichte's Theory of Subjectivity. Ameriks, Karl Kant and the Fate of Autonomy , ch. Kelm and G. La Vopa, A. Breazeale, Daniel 'Check or checkmate? On the finitude of the Fichtean self', in K. Ameriks and D. Sturma eds The Modern Subject. Emundts and S. Including the relation between ethics and right. Renaut, A.
Shell, S. Williams, R. Ferry, L. Philip , ch. Williams, Robert R. Beck, G. Nakhimovsky, I.
First to third theorems in FNR. For material on the necessity of a second self-conscious subject specifically see 'Fichte on intersubjectivity'. Wolff, E. Herbert, G. Fischbach, F. Nowak-Juchacz, E. Mather, Ronald 'On the concepts of recognition', Fichte-Studien Nomer, Nedim 'Fichte and the relationship between self-positing and rights', Journal of the History of Philosophy 48 4.
Second theorem in FNR, and elsewhere. Fichte', Archives de Philosophie Hunter, Charles K. Wolff, and Rainer Zaczyk. Jacobi and German idealism', in A. Franks, P. Redding, Paul Hegel's Hermeneutics , ch. Herbert, Gary 'Fichte's deduction of rights from self-consciousness', Interpretation 25 2. Moggach, Douglas 'Reciprocity, elicitation, recognition: the thematics of intersubjectivity in the early Fichte', Dialogue 38 2.
Neuhouser, Frederick ''Introduction' to J. Giassi, L. Beinenstock and M. Crampe-Casnabet eds Dans quelle mesure la philosophie est pratique. Fichte, Hegel. Beiser, Frederick German Idealism , part 2 ch. Scribner, F. Scott "The 'subtle matter' of intersubjectivity in the Grundlage des Naturrechts ', in D. Siemek, Marek J. Wood, Allen 'Fichte's intersubjective I', Inquiry 49 1. McNulty, Jacob 'Transcendental philosophy and intersubjectivity: mutual recognition as a condition for the possibility of self-consciousness in sections 1—3 of Fichte's Foundations of Natural Right ', European Journal of Philosophy 24 4.
Neuhouser, Frederick 'Fichte and the relationship between right and morality', in D. Perru, O. Patten, Alan Hegel's Idea of Freedom ch. Ferry, Luc 'The distinction between law and ethics in the early philosophy of Fichte', Philosophical Forum 19 James, David , 'The relation of right to morality in Fichte's Jena theory of the state and society', History of European Ideas Miller pp. Haldane and Simson vol. Siep, Ludwig Hegels Fichtekritik und die Wissenschaftslehre von Taylor, Charles Hegel , ch.
Solomon, Robert In the Spirit of Hegel , chs. For Schelling see 'Schelling'. Werner, A. Hegel and Friedrich Schlegel. Frank, M. Including Schelling on recognition. Schelling, F. Marti Peterson Heath Vater, Philosophical Forum 31 4 , Vater, Philosophical Forum 31 4 , , see section 2. Harris and P. Bowie See also 'Schellingian critiques of Hegel'. Feuerbach, L. Stepelevich ed The Young Hegelians , pp. Heidegger [19? Marx, W. Schelling: History, System, Freedom. White, A. Bowie, A. Snow, D. Beierwaltes W. Sturma, Dieter 'The nature of subjectivity: the critical and systematic function of Schelling's philosophy of nature', in S.
Lawrence, J. For intellectual intuition in Fichte see 'Fichte on self-consciousness and intellectual intuition'. Vater, Philosophical Forum 31 4 , co-authored by Hegel , see section 2. Heath , introduction and part 1 available online Williams see esp.
See also 'Schellingian critique of Hegel'. Nauen, F. Essays and Letters on Theory , ed. Pfau, Olson, A. Rosenkranz, K. Haym, R. Althaus, H. Pinkard, Terry Hegel: A Biography. Haering, T. Hyppolite, J. Lukacs, G. Asveld, P. Wylleman, A. Crites, S.
Lacorte, C. Tarsh , ch. Pinkard Hegel: A Biography , chs. Wahl, J.
ykoketomel.ml: Hegel's Idea of Philosophy: With a New Translation of Hegel's Introduction to the History of Philosophy (): Quentin Lauer, Georg. Source: Hegel's Idea of Philosophy, by Quentin Lauer, S.J. with a new translation of Hegel's Introduction to the History of Philosophy; Translated: from Georg.
Kaufmann, Walter 'Hegel's antitheological phase', Philosophical Review Young, W. Tarsh , chs. Bondeli, M. Adams, G. This is the attempt to establish the existence and properties of God and the essential doctrines of religion on the basis of reason. Rousseau, J. Reimarus  Fragments originally published as Fragmente des Wolfenbuttelschen ungenannten. Lessing, G. Pfleiderer, O. Shanks, A. For the 'Essay on natural law' see 'Essay on natural law'. For recognition in these works see 'Recognition in the Jena writings'.
For politics and ethics of the Phenomenology see 'Moral and political stance of the Phenomenology '. Essay on Natural Law. System of Ethical Life. First Philosophy of Spirit first Jena system. Hegel and the Human Spirit third Jena system. Habermas, J. Kimmerle, H. Horstmann, R. Verene ed Hegel's Social and Political Thought. Rose, G. Gerard, G.
Wood, Allen Hegel's Ethical Thought , ch. Cruysberghis, P. Bourgeois, B. In his early and later political philosophy, and both classical natural law based on the idea of nature and modern natural law based on the ideas of freedom, will and reason; for the former see also 'Greek philosophy in general and Hegel', for the latter see also 'Will and freedom as the basis of the Philosophy of Right '.
For Aquinas, see 'Aquinas and Hegel'. Bobbio, N. Riedel ed Materialien zu Hegels Rechtsphilosophie vol. Pelczynski ed Hegel's Political Philosophy. Mitias, M. Burns, T. Fonnesu, L. Wright, Kathleen 'The identity of identity and non-identity', Idealistic Studies Recognition is 'acknowledging someone as something'; intersubjectivity is the constitution of subjectivity or selfhood, or of a certain sort of self, or of a certain self-conception, through relations between subjects. For this see headings with that phrase in them. For Hegel's concept of spirit and the sociality of the self see respectively 'Spirit' and 'Community and individual, sociality of the self in Hegel'.
For recognition in Hegel's work as a whole, and for Fichte-Hegel comparisons on recognition, see 'Recognition in the Jena writings'. See 'Fichte on recognition and the relation of right'. See also 'Life in Hegel's mature system'. Hegel, 'Two fragments of on love', Clio 8 2 , Marcuse, H.
Eley ed Hegels Theorie des Subjektiven Geistes. Freiberger, E. Ormiston A. Schmidt am Busch and C. Laitinen eds Recognition and Social Ontology. Anderson, Sybol S. Sorensen, A. Cobben, Paul G. For ethics and politics in general in the Jena works see 'Jena writings politics, ethics and religion '. For recognition specifically in Phenomenology see 'Recognition in the Phenomenology'. For labour see 'Labour in Hegel'.
Cerf , pp. Hegel  Natural Law , second part. Hegel  Third Jena System, tr. Hegel [s] Lectures on the History of Philosophy , tr. Haladane and Simson, vol. Viertel Theunissen, M. Siep, Ludwig  'The struggle for recognition. Hegel's dispute with Hobbes in the Jena writings', in J. Wildt, A. Mercier-Josa, S. Henrich and R.
Horstmann eds Hegels Philosophie des Rechts. Jurist, E. Honneth, Axel 'Moral development and social struggle: Hegel's early social doctrines', in A. Honneth et al. Decker, K. Testa, I. The genesis of consciousness in Hegel's Jena writings', Critical Horizons. Gunn, Richard and Wilding, Adrian 'Revolutionary and less-than-revolutionary recognition', Heathwood Press , available online. Zhe, Liu 'Fichte's practical self-consciousness and Hegel's speculation.
Including the master-servant relation. For relation to Aristotle see 'Aristotle and Hegel: political philosophies and slavery'. Norman, Richard Hegel's Phenomenology , ch. Preuss, P. Westphal ed Method and Speculation in Hegel's Phenomenology. Flay, Joseph Hegel's Quest for Certainty , ch. Neuhouser, Frederick 'Deducing desire and recognition in the Phenomenology of Spirit ', Journal of the History of Philosophy 24 2. Jarczyk, G. Gunn, R. Pippin, Robert Hegel's Idealism , ch. Pinkard, Terry Hegel's Phenomenology , ch. Duquette, D. Osborne, P. O'Neill, J. Rauch, L.
Denker and M. Hegel: The Phenomenology of Spirit', in R. Solomon and D. Pippin, Robert 'Recognition and reconciliation: actualized agency in Hegel's Phenomenology , in K.
Ameriks and J. Stolzenberg eds Internationales Jahrbuch des Deutschen Idealismus , vol. Deligiorgi ed Hegel: New Directions , , also in B. Burke, V. Brandom, Robert B. Neuhouser, Frederick 'Desire, recognition, and the relation between bondsman and lord', in K. Houlgate, Stephen ' Why does the development of self-consciousness in Hegel's Phenomenology make recognition necessary?
Schmidt am Busch, H. Schmidt-am-Busch and C. Siep, Ludwig ' Mutual recognition: Hegel and beyond', in H. Stern, Robert 'Is Hegel's master-slave dialectic a refutation of solipsism? See also ' Fichte on recognition and the relation of right '. Wood, Allen B. See also 'Punishment'. Phenomenology of Spirit , section on 'Conscience'. Bernstein, J.
Brinkmann, Klaus 'Hegel on forgiveness', in E. Hoff, Shannon 'On law, transgression and forgiveness: Hegel and the politics of liberalism', Philosophical Forum 42 2. Farneth, Molly 'Hegel's sacramental politics: confession, forgiveness and absolute spirit', Journal of Religion , 95 2. For comparisons with the earlier writings see 'Recognition in Hegel's work as a whole'. Chitty, Andrew 'On Hegel, the subject and political justification', sections , Res Publica 2 2. Chitty, Andrew 'Recognition and social relations of production', section 3, Historical Materialism 2.
Peperzak, Adriaan T. For other specific areas see 'Recognition in abstract right', 'Freedom and recognition in Hegel'. For Honneth's view see 'Honneth on Hegel'. Theunissen, Michael  'The repressed intersubjectivity in Hegel's philosophy of right', in D. Cornell et al. Redding, Paul Hegel's Hermeneutics , chs. Patten, Alan Hegel's Theory of Freedom , chs. Moyar, Dean Hegel's Conscience , ch. See also 'Metaphysics of Hegel: social-Kantian interpretations'. See also 'Concept and universal in Hegel, identity and difference'.
Westphal, Merold 'Hegel's theory of the concept', in W. Steinkraus and K. See also 'Aristotle and Hegel: political philosophy'. Davis, D. Patterson, O. Smith, Steven 'Hegel on slavery and domination', Review of Metaphysics Buck-Morss, S. Recognition by others as a necessary condition of self-consciousness or selfhood or personhood. See 'Self-consciousness in the Phenomenology'.
See 'Freedom and recognition in Hegel'. See A Marx bibliography : 'Recognition in Marx'. See also 'End of history'. Nichols , esp. Poster, M. Descombes, V. Goldford, D. Roth, M. Butler, J. Lynch, R. Siep, Ludwig 'The Aufhebung of morality in ethical life' in L. Siep, Ludwig 'Recht und Anerkennung', in H. Girndt ed Selbstbehauptung und Anerkennung. Honneth, Axel [ ] ' Gerechtigkeit und Kommunikative Freiheit. Merker, G. Mohr, and M. Honneth, Axel  'Das Reich der verwirklichten Freiheit.
Honneth, Axel 'From desire to recognition: Hegel's account of human sociality', in D. Moyar and M. De Boer, Karin 'Beyond recognition? Including corresponding parts of Philosophy of Spirit. For ch. Baillie, J. Norman, R. Verene, D. Cherniak and J. Heckman Nichols Loewenberg, J. Dudeck, C. Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. Flay, J. Reed, E. Simpson, P. Shine is defined as "all that still remains" das ganze Rest of Essence, "all that still remains" against Essence, its "leftover".
It should be noted, nevertheless, that this "leftover" should not be conceived of as being "outside" or externally opposed to Essence as we have seen, that would once again be a logical movement pertaining to the sphere of Being. On the contrary, shine is something "null" with respect to Essence. While the "other", discussed by Hegel in the Logic of Being, preserves the positive self-standing of the "something" against which it is also opposed the "other" is a being-there characterized by an external limitation, a "negated being there" 10 , shine is only something negative; it only has the moment of the "not-being-there" Nichtdasein.
Shine does not have any positive consistency against Essence, but it constitutively depends on Essence itself. Essence, therefore, does not merely oppose itself to Being, but arises from within Being, so that Being passes over into Essence. Yet, Essence is not something "other" with respect to shine - and, consequently, to Being, which has determined itself as shine through the unessential. Essence is therefore "the truth" of Being, which, for its part, has to be preserved within Essence.
Therefore Being is preserved within Essence. In this way, reflection, i. Reflection emerges, specifically, as the unfolding of the mediation present only in itself within shine. Reflection results at first as the liberation within shine itself of mediation from immediacy. Reflection is defined here as "shine that has withdrawn into itself and so is estranged from its immediacy".
This movement gains subsistence only by negating the negative qua negative i. Starting from the definition of reflection as the movement of negating the negative, the dialectic of positing and presupposing plays the role of mediating the relation between the abstract and empty reflection of Essence within itself, and the positivity of Being, which has to be sublated within the reflection of Essence.
Firstly 1. Positing Reflection , Essence is the reflective movement of negating the negative. This negative is shine conceived of as what has been posited by Essence within itself; 18 shine qua something posited is not the "other" of Essence, but it is the presupposing of Essence itself. Secondly 2. External Reflection , Essence presupposes an immediate, external, and positive being-there as the starting point of its reflective movement. Determining Reflection , Essence mediates the first two moments - i.
This complex dialectical movement is at work in determining the relation between nature and spirit. Yet, to what extent does this dialectical movement play a role in determining the relation between nature and spirit? In the Introduction to the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit called "Concept of Spirit" 23 Hegel explicitly recalls the terms of the logical transition from Being to Essence. Revelation , as the revelation of the abstract Idea, is the unmediated transition, the becoming , of nature.
As the revelation of spirit, which is free, it is the positing of nature as its world; but because this positing is reflection, it is at the same time the presupposition of the world as independent nature.
Revelation in the concept is creation of nature as its being, in which the spirit procures the affirmation and truth of its freedom. Spirit, like Essence, is not something positive, a being-there, a thing Ding 25 dualistically opposed to nature. Rather, it is only a negative and reflexive movement, which subsists only insofar as it negates nature as its own negative. Only insofar as it negates nature as its own negative, spirit is the Idea-for-itself, 26 namely the Idea returned within itself from the externality of nature:.
For us spirit has nature as its presupposition , though spirit is the truth of nature, and is thus absolutely first with respect to it. In this truth [ in spirit , FS] nature has vanished, and spirit has emerged as the Idea that has reached its being-for-self [ This identity is absolute negativity , since in nature the concept has its complete, external objectivity, but this externalization of the concept has been sublated and the concept has, in this externalization, become identical with itself.
And so the concept is this identity only so far as it is at the same time a return out of nature. These passages show that the relation between nature and spirit does not take place merely between two terms nature and spirit , but includes as its protagonist the Idea, qua absolute ontological structure of reality, which manifests itself according to these two forms. The relation between nature and spirit takes place against the background of the Idea i.
According to Hegel, it is only by taking into account this broader background that it can be possible to adequately understand spirit's relation to nature. In particular, in the first passage, Hegel seems to speak of a twofold revelation. From the perspective of the abstract Idea, nature is an unmediated revelation. It is the unmediated manifestation of nature qua "complete, external objectivity". However, as I shall argue see section 4 , there is more to be said about the revelation from the perspective of spirit. As a matter of fact, I shall claim that the perspective of spirit on nature is itself twofold and, therefore, that there are three perspectives which must be taken into account.
First, there is the unmediated revelation of the abstract Idea, which manifests itself in nature apparently without spirit playing a role in this revelation. Second, there is the perspective of finite spirit on nature as I will claim in section 4. Third, there is the perspective of absolute spirit, which is not explicitly mentioned in the quoted passages and coincides with the perspective of the Idea in-and-for-itself.
As I will claim in section 4. According to this analysis, the perspective of finite spirit seems therefore to mediate between the revelation of the abstract Idea and the perspective of infinite spirit i. It accounts for the transition from a merely presupposed nature - qua result of the revelation of the abstract Idea - to the perspective of absolute spirit, which conceives of itself as the positing agent of nature.
I will problematize the consistency of these three perspectives in sections 3 and 4 as well as in the conclusions. For the moment, what must be stressed is that these perspectives are interrelated. In particular, Hegel seems to hold that the absolute Idea, manifesting itself in nature and spirit, mediates the relation from nature to spirit in both directions according to the movement of positing and presupposing : from presupposed nature to spirit and from positing spirit to nature.
The absolute process has two opposing directions in itself: one inside out, one outside in. These two streams penetrate one another, their recoil is only shine [ italics mine , FS]. This is one and the same, eternal activity. Finding a world before oneself is the one side, the other side is that spirit produces the world as something posited by spirit itself.
Both [ movements , FS] are one and the same. The two directions of the mediating relation between nature and spirit are therefore represented by the movements of positing and presupposing. In the "Logic", on the one hand, the reflection of Essence posits Being as something null, as shine 1. Positing Reflection ; on the other hand the reflection of Essence arises as negation of a positive, presupposed being-there 2.
External Reflection. Similarly, the transition from nature to spirit must be understood as a double movement: on the one hand, spirit seems both to posit external nature as something null and to reflect in itself starting from this position ; on the other hand spirit seems to arise as negation of the positive and presupposed immediacy of nature, as negation of a pre-existent, independent and external world, which is the result of the revelation of the abstract Idea. So far, I have maintained that the relation between nature and spirit is adequately understood when read in the broader context of the structure of the Idea whose manifestations are nature and spirit , and that Hegel invites us to think of this mediation as the unity of the movements of positing and presupposing , discussed in the "Science of Logic" in the transition from Being to Essence.
My claim is that an ambiguity arises within this specific logical context, which has decisive repercussions on the relation between the spheres of nature and spirit. In the first moment of reflection 1. Positing Reflection Being qua shine is not a positive determination, against which Essence would be the immediately determinate negation.
Rather, Being qua shine is only a reverberation of the reflective movement of Essence. External Reflection , on the contrary, being-there arises again as a positive presupposition - this positive presupposition stands over against reflection, which finds it as a mere given. According to Hegel, 1 the negative positedness namely, shine qua shine of Essence discussed within positing reflection and 2 the positive, presupposed being-there treated within external reflection are sublated in 3 determinate being as positive positedness.
Thus, determinate being 33 would mediate between the sheer negativity of positing reflection which posits only a mere shine, a nullity within itself and the positive, immediate being-there that figures as the presupposition of external reflection. Determining reflection is in general the unity of positing and external reflection.
This is to be considered in more detail [ Determinate being is merely posited being or positedness ; this is the principle expressing essence about determinate being. Positedness stands opposed, on the one hand, to determinate being, and on the other, to essence, and is to be considered as the middle term which unites determinate being with essence, and conversely, essence with determinate being. Nevertheless, given this context, it seems to me problematic to dialectically identify and sublate both 1 shine as negative positedness and 2 being-there as positive presupposition of Essence itself into 3 posited determinate being.
This tension between positive immediacy and negative positedness seems to be closely connected to the difficulty concerning the relation between nature and spirit. At the logical level, there is a contradiction between shine qua negative positedness of Essence in 1. Positing Reflection and the presupposed, positive being-there standing against Essence in 2. Similarly, there is a contradiction in the Realphilosophie between nature qua negative positedness of spirit and nature as a positive presupposition of spirit.
On the one hand, nature is described as something having an independent subsistence like the presupposed being-there in external reflection : "Nature is the negative of its own Idea [ Even if spirit was not there, nature would still be what it is; it is for itself. On the other hand, nature is described as something negative, which subsists only insofar as it is posited by spirit like shine, which is posited by positing reflection : "Its [ Nature's , FS] characteristic is positedness , the negative, in the same way that the ancients grasped matter in general as the non-ens.
What is this ambiguity rooted in? Positing Reflection and 2. The ambiguity arises when Being, which is at first merely opposed to Essence, is identified with the shine of Essence itself Schein des Wesens. Hegel actually identifies in his concept of shine the positive immediacy of Being qua "all that still remains" against Essence, on the one hand, and the negative immediacy of Essence itself, on the other. The problematic character of these passages has been effectively highlighted by D. If we permit ourselves a discourse which is not protected by formal-ontologic definitions, then we can say that shine, though already absolutely sublated, has a side which does not depend on Essence [ If we ask on behalf of what we can make understandable the fact that we actually can talk about that side, then we could hardly avoid referencing the following: Being, which is sublated within Essence, must have a "content", which does not derive stammt from Essence.
These contents can, of course, become dependent on Essence by virtue of the negation of Essence. Yet it is hard to see how these contents could emerge by virtue of the internal logic of the concept of Essence, so that they are preserved bewahrt within Essence [ Shine, although constantly negated, must in some sense be an "other" against Essence. At the beginning this otherness can be designated only by talking about an immediate side.
Without investigating this issue further, Hegel tries to build a concept of shine that allows a perspective on further logical development by referring to the logic of otherness. Since Being is otherness, and since Being has been sublated by Essence into shine, the logic of otherness can be helpful in structuring the logic of shine only if the logic of otherness is rethought umformuliert. According to Henrich, the concept of shine carries out the transformation Umformulierung - within the Logic of Essence - of what otherness is in the sphere of Being.
In the sphere of Being otherness is linked to the positiveness of being-there. However, this cannot apply to shine, which is a not-being-there Nichtdasein. This shift should justify - if I understand Henrich correctly - the preservation within and the translation of the "content" of Being in terms of negative immediacy of shine, which in turn depends on Essence itself. By virtue of this "shift of meaning" Bedeutungsverschiebung , the 1. In particular, it is the "first immediacy" of shine qua "all that still remains" of Being, which is to some extent still opposed to Essence that arises again in external reflection as external presupposition.
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